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FROM QUANTIFICATION TO QUALIFICATION: A STATE
COURT'S DISTORTION OF THE LAW IN IN RE GENERAL
ADJUDICATION OF ALL RIGHTS TO USE WATER IN THE BIG
HORN RIVER SYSTEM
Berrie Martinis
Abstract: The Wyoming Supreme Court applied state law to Indian reserved water
rights in its recent decision in In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the
Big Horn River System (Big Horn III). Prior to Big Horn 111, courts never applied state
law to such rights. This Note argues that the Wyoming decision contradicts federal
reserved water rights law and federal Indian law, and concludes that Congress should
enact legislation overturning the Big Horn III decision.
Indian tribes lost virtually all their land and other resources when
white settlers moved across the United States during the 1800s. Fed-
eral Indian law protects the limited resources that the tribes possess
today, primarily by promoting the tribal right of self-determination.
Many areas of federal Indian law, including Indian water rights law,
reflect the tribal right of self-determination. The recent Wyoming
Supreme Court decision in In re General Adjudication of All Rights to
Use Water in the Big Horn River System (Big Horn 11I), 1 however,
contradicts Indian water rights law and undermines tribal self-
determination.
In Big Horn III, the Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes
attempted to protect and enhance their resources on the Wind River
Indian Reservation by dedicating a portion of their water to instream
flow.2 The Wyoming court determined that the Tribes did not have
the right to make such a dedication of their water.3 The Wyoming
court applied state law when it should have applied federal law, and
misapplied the federal law on which it relied. The court determined
the purposes for which the Tribes could use their water (qualification)
by applying a method courts have developed for determining the
amount of water allocable to tribes on reservations (quantification). '
The Wyoming court's limitation of the Tribes' use of their water con-
tradicts tribal self-determination and denigrates the sovereignty of
Indian tribes. The decision, therefore, is adverse not only to federal
1. 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992).
2. Id. at 275.
3. Id. at 279.
4. Id. at 278-79.
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water law, but also to the federal policy promoting tribal self-govern-
ance and economic self-sufficiency.
The history of water law and Indian water rights in the United
States clearly clashes with the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in
Big Horn 11M Big Horn III undermines legal precedent and federal
Indian policy, and injects uncertainty into reserved water rights which
exist under federal law and should not vary among: the states. Con-
gress should enact legislation to reverse Big Horn II and to prevent
other states from making similar decisions in the future. Such legisla-
tion should clarify that tribes, and not states, have authority to admin-
ister reserved water rights on Indian reservations. If Congress does
not act, states will continue to apply laws and policies that undermine
tribal rights.
I. STATE WATER LAW AND FEDERAL RESERVED
WATER RIGHTS
Big Horn III involves principles of both water law and federal
Indian law. Water law is comprised of both state and federal doc-
trines. The dual state and federal water law doctrines caused much of
the controversy behind Big Horn IM1 Federal Indian law also plays an
important role in defining Indian water rights because the federal gov-
ernment has a duty to treat Indian rights with deference.
A. The Duality of Water Law in the Western States: Prior
Appropriation and Reserved Rights
There are two basic kinds of water rights in the western United
States: prior appropriation rights and reserved rights. 5 Appropriation
rights exist under state law, while reserved rights exist under federal
law, specifically, federal common law. The reserved rights doctrine
was first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Winters v.
United States, 6 and has not been codified by Congress. State and fed-
eral water laws conflict in some areas of water law, including quantifi-
cation and administration of water rights, yet state courts have
jurisdiction to adjudicate reserved water rights.
5. The eastern states also recognize riparian water rights. For a discussion of riparian water
rights, see 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.01 (Robert E. Beck et al. eds., 5th ed. 1991).




L The Basics of Prior Appropriation: "First-in-Time" and Beneficial
Use
Prior appropriation is the primary water rights allocation system of
the western states.7 These states have long recognized water as a
scarce resource,8 and use the prior appropriation system to administer
it. The prior appropriation system gives a water right to whoever first
appropriates the water9 for a "beneficial use,"10 which is defined by
state law. Beneficial use traditionally required a diversion of water;"
the appropriator had to divert the water from its natural stream.
"Instream flow" does not fit the traditional definition of beneficial use,
because it is undiverted water that remains in its natural stream. 12
Consequently, water rights appropriators traditionally could not use
their water as instream flow. The modern trend, however, includes
instream flow in the definition of beneficial use.13
Under state law, beneficial use defines the extent of the prior appro-
priation water right.14 A water right holder may appropriate only the
quantity of water that the holder can put to a beneficial use. Addition-
ally, the water user must continue the beneficial use to maintain a
prior appropriation right. 15
2. The Origin of Reserved Water Rights Law: The Winters Doctrine
Unlike state regulated prior appropriation rights, reserved water
rights exist under federal law. The United States Supreme Court first
recognized Indian reserved water rights in 1908, in Winters v. United
7. Lee H. Storey, Leasing Indian Water Off the Reservation: A Use Consistent with the
Reservation's Purpose, 76 CAL. L. REV. 179, 185 (1988).
8. See D. Craig Bell & Norman K. Johnson, State Water Laws and Federal Water Uses: The
History of Conflict, the Prospects for Accommodation, 21 ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (1991).
9. This rule is commonly referred to as first-in-time equals first-in-right. See id. at 5; David
H. Getches, Water Rights on Indian Allotments, 26 S.D. L. REv. 405, 407-08 (1981).
10. See Bell & Johnson, supra note 8, at 5; Getches, supra note 9, at 407-08.
11. See, eg., In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 835 P.2d 273, 279 (Wyo. 1992) [hereinafter Big Horn III]; see also Getches, supra note
9, at 407-08; Matthew J. McKinney, Instream Flow Policy in Montana: A History and Blueprint
for the Future, 11 PUB. LAND L. REV. 81, 81 n.1 (1990).
12. See McKinney, supra note 11, at 81 n.2.
13. Big Horn III, 835 P.2d at 279 (citing Rick A. Thompson, Comment, Statutory
Recognition of Instream Flow Preservation: A Proposed Solution for Wyoming, 17 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 139, 143 (1982)).
14. Bell & Johnson, supra note 8, at 5.
15. The beneficial use doctrine allows water rights to expire. If a water right holder does not
use the water, then the right expires and someone else can claim the water right. See id.
(referring to the "use-it-or-lose-it" principle).
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States.16 In that case, the Supreme Court held that the federal reserva-
tion of land for the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation included an
implicit reservation of water necessary to carry out the purposes of the
land reservation. 7 The Court established the reserved water rights
doctrine, which implies a water right on any federally reserved land
which needs water to carry out the purposes of the reservation. The
water right dates back to the federal reservation of the land, and is
superior to subsequently granted state water rights. 18 The Winters
Court, however, did not quantify the water reserved. 9
3. Quantification of the Reserved Water Right
Subsequent to the Winters Court's recognition of the reserved water
right, other courts have developed methods of quantifying reserved
water rights.2 ° The Supreme Court sUpports the primary purpose test
for quantifying non-Indian reserved water rights, arid the practicably
irrigable acreage test (PIA test) for quantifying Indian reserved water
rights. Quantification of federal reserved water rights allows the state
to allocate remaining available water to state users. Because reserved
water rights are superior to subsequent water rights granted under
state law, reserved water rights must be quantified so that state water
rights holders can predict their water supply. In Arizona, for
instance, the state entered into an agreement with the Papago Tribe,
16. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). Because of its origin in Winters, the reserved water rights doctrine is
commonly called the Winters doctrine and the right is called the Winters right.
17. Id. at 576-77.
18. See id. at 577. For further discussion of the superiority of the Winters right, see Thomas
H. Pacheco, How Big Is Big? The Scope of Water Rights Suits Under the McCarran Amendment,
15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 627, 630-31 (1988) (citing Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138
(1976)).
The Winters doctrine is not limited to Indian reservations, but applies to any federal
reservation of land. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). For a general discussion of
the differences between Indian reserved water rights and other federally reserved water rights, see
FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 582-85 (Rennard Strickland et al.
eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN].
19. Cf In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System,
753 P.2d 76, 96 (Wyo. 1988) (quantifying Indian reserved water rights), cert. granted in part, 488
U.S. 1040, and aff'd by an equally divided Court sub nom. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S.
406 (1989) (per curiam) [hereinafter Big Horn I].
20. Quantification refers to how much water is reserved for a federal land reservation.
Qualification, by contrast, refers to how that water can be used. See infra notes 36-39 and
accompanying text (describing the Court's refusal to qualify Indian reserved water rights).
Quantification becomes important when the number of water rights holders exceeds the amount
of allocable water. Not all water rights holders will be able to use as much water as they are
entitled to when demand exceeds the water supply.
Vol. 68:435, 1993
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which Congress codified, that permitted the Papago to sell their excess
water to the state.21
a. The Primary Purpose Test for Quantifying Reserved Water
Rights
Quantifying reserved water rights is difficult because most entities
have not asserted their right to the water prior to an adjudication.
Courts have developed a "primary purpose" test to overcome this diffi-
culty.22 The test involves two steps. The court first determines the
federal government's intended use for the reserved land. The federal
government's intended use at the time the reservation was created is
the "primary purpose" of the reservation. The court then determines
whether water was necessary for that primary purpose. If so, the
court finds a reserved water right for the reserved land.23
The United States Supreme Court has supported the primary pur-
pose test for determining reserved water rights on non-Indian federal
reservations.2 4 In United States v. New Mexico, 25 for instance, the
Supreme Court used the "primary purpose" test to quantify the fed-
eral government's reserved water right for the Gila National Forest. 26
Some lower courts have applied the primary purpose test to determine
reserved water rights on Indian reservations. These courts generally
find that the primary purpose of the Indian reservation is either hunt-
ing and fishing, or agriculture.27 The Supreme Court, however, has
never applied the primary purpose test to an Indian reservation.
Some courts have found a general homeland purpose for Indian res-
ervations.28 The general homeland purpose is more difficult to quan-
tify than hunting and fishing, or agriculture, because it is not limited
21. See Nancy K. Laney, Transferability Under the Papago Water Rights Settlement, 26
ARIz. L. REV. 421, 430 (1984) (non-Indian interests provided impetus for negotiations of Papago
Tribe's reserved water right); see also John E. Thorson, Resolving Conflicts Through
Intergovernmental Agreements: The Pros and Cons ofNegotiated Settlements, in INDIAN WATER
1985: COLLECTED ESSAYS 25, 36 (Christine L. Miklas & Steven J. Shupe eds., 1986).
22. See, eg., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700 (1978). The Supreme Court did
not use the phrase "primary purpose test," but subsequent courts have so dubbed the test. See,
e.g., Big Horn III, 835 P.2d 273, 278 (Wyo. 1992).
23. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700-02.
24. Id.; see also Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 139-41 (1976).
25. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
26. Id. at 716-18; see also supra note 22.
27. See, eg., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1409 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1252 (1984) (finding primary purposes to be both agriculture, and hunting, fishing, and
gathering); Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d 76, 97 (Wyo. 1988) (finding agriculture to be the primary
purpose of the Wind River Reservation).
28. See, e.g., Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
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to one primary use. Rather, the general homeland purpose recognizes
that Indian reservations were not set aside for mere economic survival,
but for broader benefits to Indian tribes.29 When a court finds a gen-
eral homeland purpose under the primary purpose test, it must allow
the tribes to use their water for various purposes. This makes the pri-
mary purpose test similar to the PIA test which the Supreme Court
applies to Indian reservations.
b. The Practicably Irrigable Acreage Test for Quantifying the
Reserved Water Rights on Indian Reservations
The Supreme Court has supported the PIA test for quantifying
reserved water rights when an Indian reservation's primary purpose is
agriculture.3" The Court first determines the quantity of water neces-
sary to irrigate all the practicably irrigable acres o:a the reservation,
and then awards that amount as the reserved water right.31 Quantifi-
cation, therefore, includes not only the water necessary to irrigate
presently farmed land, but also the water necessary to irrigate other
areas of land that could be converted to farmland.32
The United States Supreme Court first affirmed the use of the PIA
test in Arizona v. California,33 when the Court adjudicated the rights
of several states and the United States to the waters of the Colorado
29. Id. at 49. One commentator argues that the general homeland purpose includes changing
needs and developments of the tribes. Just as the citizens of states change industries and develop
new ways of life, so should Indian tribes be able to experience these changes and have the water
to meet their new needs for it. See Note, Indian Reserved Water Rights: The Winters of Our
Discontent, 88 YALE L.J. 1689, 1700 (1979).
The federal government created Indian reservations in two ways. Congress created
reservations primarily through ratification of treaties with Indian tribes, and the executive
branch created reservations through executive orders. See COHEN, supra note 18, at 127-28.
Hereinafter, any reference to congressional reservation of lands refers zlso to executive orders.
The government did not restrict the use of the land it reserved for Incian tribes. Congress did
promote the practice and development of western European culture, such as agriculture, among
the tribes, but it did not restrict tribal decisions about land use. See, eg. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at
97-98. For a discussion of the imposition of European culture on Indian tribes, see generally
Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy:. The Rehnquist Court's Perpetuation of European
Cultural Racism Against American Indian Tribes, 39 FED. B. NEws & J. 358 (1992).
30. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963). The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the use of the PIA test more recently in Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406
(1989). Where the purpose of the reservation is other than to promote agriculture, another
method of quantifying would be necessary. Getches, supra note 9, at 410-I1.
31. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 600-01.
32. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 100-01; see also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 600-01. This
measure includes future water needs. See Big Horn III, 835 P.2d 273, 276 (Wyo. 1992)
(discussing the "future project water").
33. 373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963).
440
Indian Water Rights
River.34 The Arizona Court afirmed the United States' right to
reserve waters for Indian reservations.3" The Court also held that the
PIA test was the only "feasible and fair way"36 to quantify the tribal
water rights because the Court could not assess the future water needs
of the Indian tribes at the time of its decision. 7 In a supplemental
decree, the Supreme Court stated that the measure only applied to
quantification, and did not restrict tribal use of water.38 Tribes could
use their water for purposes other than irrigation as long as the use did
not exceed the quantified amount of water.39 The PIA test is used
only to quantify, not to qualify, an Indian reserved water right.
4. State Jurisdiction over Reserved Water Rights
Once a court quantifies a reserved water right, it must determine
who will administer and regulate the water right. Generally, tribal
sovereignty and federal Indian law both preempt states from exercis-
ing jurisdiction over Indians and Indian property in Indian country."
The United States Supreme Court first recognized this general pre-
emption in Worcester v. Georgia41 in 1832. In Worcester, the state of
Georgia attempted to restrict residence on the Cherokee Reservation.
The Court held that Georgia could not make such restrictions,
because state law was not valid on the Reservation.42 More recently,
the Court has relied on preemption to prohibit state taxation of Indian
property on reservation lands.4 a These holdings make it clear that the
tribes enjoy limited sovereignty.' Thus, the states generally cannot
interfere with real and personal property belonging to tribes, 4 includ-
ing reserved water rights.46
As part of the preemption finding, the Supreme Court recognized
Congress' trust duty to protect Indian tribes from state regulation.47
34. Id. at 550-51.
35. See id. at 598.
36. Id. at 601.
37. Id.
38. Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419, 422 (1979).
39. Id.
40. COHEN, supra note 18, at 270, 349, 582.
41. 31 U.S. 515 (1832). But see New Mexico v. Mescalero, 462 U.S. 324, 331 (1983)
(acknowledging limitations on tribal sovereignty).
42. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
43. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172-77 (1973).
44. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559, 561.
45. See COHEN, supra note 18, at 349.
46. Reserved water rights are property rights. See id. at 576.
47. See id. at 220-25; see also McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 169-71 (implementing the canons
relating to the trust duty as described in COHEN, supra note 18).
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Under this trust duty, Congress must act in the best interest of the
tribes.4 8 Consequently, Congress provides broader protection for
Indian water rights than for other reserved water rights.4 9 Unless
Congress states otherwise, tribal sovereignty and federal Indian law
preempt the states from controlling Indian reservations.50 Congress
may, however, allow states such control by delegating to them limited
power over Indian tribes.5
Notwithstanding Congress' trust duty, states gained limited juris-
diction over federal reserved water rights when Congress passed the
McCarran Amendment in 1952.52 Prior to the McCarran Amend-
ment, the federal and Indian reserved water rights were thought
immune from state and federal court actions.53 The McCarran
Amendment, however, provided a limited waiver of federal sovereign
immunity.5 4 After the Amendment, both federal and state courts can
adjudicate federal reserved water rights.55 Therefore, a state can now
adjudicate all water rights existing within the state's boundaries. 56
Similarly, a federal court can dismiss a federal action in favor of a state
proceeding, although it is not required to do so.57
The McCarran Amendment does not change substantive water law.
The Amendment is strictly a procedural device to allow courts to exer-
cise jurisdiction over reserved water rights holders in a general water
rights adjudication. 8  Legislative attempts since the McCarran
48. See COHEN, supra note 18, at 220-25; see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17
(1831) (referring to Indian tribes' relationship with the United States as similar to that of a "ward
to his guardian").
49. See COHEN, supra note 18, at 583-84; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17 (referring to Indian
tribes as "domestic dependent nations").
50. See McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 170-71 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF TIE INTERIOR, FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 845 (1958)); see also Susan Williams, Indian Winters Water RightsAdministration:
Averting New War, 11 PuB. LAND L. REV. 53, 58 (1990). But cf United States v. Anderson, 736
F.2d 1358, 1366 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the state could regulate non-Indian, surplus water
rights on the Spokane Indian Reservation).
51. See COHEN, supra note 18, at 349, 361.
52. 43 U.S.C.A. § 666 (West 1986).
53. Note, supra note 29, at 1708-09 n.109 (citing Brief for the United States at 8-19, United
States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971) (No. 87)).
54. 43 U.S.C.A. § 666 (West 1986); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 809-10 (1976).
55. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 809.
56. United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 524 (1971).
57. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1400-02 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1252 (1984). Factors relevant to the district court judge's decision whether to dismiss include
whether questions of federal law need to be determined, and whether duplication or waste of
judicial resources would occur as the result of either a dismissal or going forward with the federal
court action when a state action is pending. See id. at 1404.




Amendment to subject federally reserved water to substantive state
control have failed. 9 Absent legislation to the contrary, federal law
still determines the scope and use of federal reserved water rights."
. Tribal Self-Determination and Self-Governance
In addition to leaving federal water law untouched, the McCarran
Amendment did not alter congressional policies promoting tribal self-
determination and self-governance. The Indian Reorganization Act
(IRA) of 193461 enunciates these policies and attempts to redress Con-
gress' previous disastrous policies of removal and assimilation.
Congress supported policies of removal62 and assimilation6 3 in the
1800s. In the early 1800s, Congress opened up the eastern United
States to white settlers by removing Indian tribes to the West and eras-
ing the boundaries of their homelands.14 After removing most of the
eastern tribes to the western United States, the federal government
established reservations in the West, confining Indians to less land in
order to provide more land for the white settlers. 5
After establishing reservations, Congress enacted the General Allot-
ment Act (GAA)66 in 1887 to break up the reservations and assimilate
Indians as ordinary citizens. The GAA program divided the reserva-
tions into plots, providing a fixed amount of reservation land to each
tribal Indian.6 7 The United States subsequently purchased the "sur-
59. See Note, supra note 29, at 1703-04; see also Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 145.
60. See United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. at 526. The Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution provides for supremacy of federal laws over inconsistent state law.
U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2. The Ninth Circuit found federal law preemptive of state law in the
context of Indian water rights in Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). In Walton, the court noted that the Indian reserved
water right was superior to state rights and not subject to state laws of appropriation. Id. at 46.
61. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 461-479 (West 1983) [hereinafter IRA].
62. The policy of removal was codified by the Indian Removal Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 174 (West
1983).
63. The policy of assimilation was codified by the Dawes Indian General Allotment Act, 25
U.S.C.A. §§ 331-334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (West 1983) [hereinafter GAA].
64. COHEN, supra note 18, at 78-79. Indians were threatened with subjection to state
jurisdiction if they did not emigrate from their homelands in the eastern region of the United
States. Id. at 81.
65. The tribes agreed to these reservation treaties primarily in exchange for the promise of
protection by the federal government. Many of these treaties had guaranteed protection from
state control. See, e.g., id. at 87 (describing the 1825 treaty with the Choctaws). A group of
treaties negotiated in 1851 with the California tribes was written to allow state jurisdiction over
the Indian reservations, but these treaties were never ratified because the California state
legislature protested the assignment of lands to the tribes. Id. at 97.
66. GAA, supra note 63.
67. See COHEN, supra note 18, at 130-31.
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plus" land on the reservation and sold it to white settlers.68 Indian
tribes ultimately lost ninety million acres under the GAA program.69
When Congress finally recognized the tragedy and injustice of the
removal and assimilation eras, federal policy shifted and Congress
passed the IRA in 1934.70 The IRA attempted to encourage economic
development, cultural plurality, and tribalism.71 It also attempted to
improve economic conditions and halt further tribal land loss. 72 To
further these goals, Congress promoted tribal self-determination and
self-governance.73
Although the federal government currently follows the policies
codified in the IRA, the Termination Era of the 1940s and 1950s
caused a break in the policy.7 4 Termination policy sought an end to
the trust relationship between the United States and Indian tribes, and
Congress once again attempted to assimilate Indians as ordinary citi-
zens of the United States.75 However, the civil rights movement of the
1950s and 1960s led to the federal government's reaffirmation of the
policy of self-determination. 6 After President Nixon's Special
Message to Congress on July 8, 1970 urging Congress to repudiate its
tribal termination policy, Congress enacted new legislation reviving
self-determination. 77 The President's message and the subsequent leg-
islation resulted from a decade of the presence of Indian issues in the
political arena.78 The Menominee Restoration Act of 197379 symboli-
68. See id. at 137-38. Instead of dividing the reservations equally among the tribal members,
the federal government allotted a predetermined acreage to each Indian. The number of acres
given to each allottee diminished as the program progressed. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 331 historical
note (West 1983). For a more detailed discussion of the GAA program, see COHEN, supra note
18, at 130-38.
69. Total Indian lands shrank from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million acres in 1934.
COHEN, supra note 18, at 138. In addition to the tremendous land loss, the GAA devastated
tribalism and native cultures. For a discussion of these effects, see generally Williams, supra note
29, at 363-67.
70. IRA, supra note 61.
71. COHEN, supra note 18, at 147 (citing session hearings). The stated purpose of the IRA
was "[t]o conserve and develop Indian lands and resources; to extend to Indians the right to form
business and other organizations; to establish a credit system for Indians; to grant certain rights
of home rule to Indians; to provide for vocational education for Indians; and for other purposes."
S. 3645, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
72. COHEN, supra note 18, at 147.
73. Id. at 149.
74. See id. at 152-80 for a thorough discussion of the Termination Era.
75. See id. at 164.
76. Id. at 180.
77. Id. at 185-87.
78. Id. at 182-88.
79. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 903-903f (West 1973) (repealing §§ 891-902).
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cally reversed the termination policy and reinstated the policy of tribal
self-determination. 0
II. IN RE GENERAL ADJUDICATION OF ALL RIGHTS TO
USE WATER IN THE BIG HORN RIVER SYSTEM
(BIG HORN I11)
Big Horn III challenges the federal preemption of state law on
Indian reservations.8" The case is the latest in a series of cases adjudi-
cating water rights in the Big Horn river system. The three Big Horn
cases have attempted to determine who has the right to use water in
the Big Horn river system, and also to quantify and administer those
rights. Big Horn III asserts that states have jurisdiction over all of
these functions.
In Big Horn 1, 2 the first in this series of cases, the court determined
and quantified the Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes' water
right. The Wyoming court interpreted the treaty creating the Wind
River Indian Reservation, and concluded that agriculture was the Res-
ervation's primary purpose.8 3 The court then quantified the Shoshone
and Northern Arapaho Tribes' reserved water right using the PIA
test.4 Several parties appealed the Big Horn I decision to the United
States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari only on
the question of whether the PIA test was the proper method for quan-
tifying the reserved water right.8" The Court affirmed the state court's
use of the PIA method, 6 but it did not address other parts of the Big
Horn I decision.8 7
After Big Horn I, the Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes
sought to administer their water right and dedicated a portion of their
80. COHEN, supra note 18, at 186-87. More recent legislation reaffirming self-determination
policy includes the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act of 1975, 25
U.S.C.A. §§ 450-450n, 455-458e (West 1983), and the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25
U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1963 (West 1983). See COHEN, supra note 18, at 194-96.
81. Big Horn Ii, 835 P.2d 273, 275 (Wyo. 1992).
82. 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988).
83. The Big Horn I court determined the primary purpose by examining Congress' purpose
for setting up the reservation: to encourage the tribes to develop an agricultural lifestyle. Id. at
97; see supra text accompanying notes 22-27 for a discussion of primary purpose.
84. Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 100-01; see supra text accompanying notes 30-39 for a discussion
of the PIA test.
85. Wyoming v. United States, 488 U.S. 1040 (certiorari granted in part, "limited to Question
2"), cert. denied in part, 492 U.S. 926 (1989).
86. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989) (per curiam) (4-4 decision).
87. For further discussion of this partial review, see Walter Rusinek, A Preview of Coming
Attractions? Wyoming v. United States and the Reserved Rights Doctrine, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 355,
393-94 (1990).
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water to instream flow for fisheries and other purposes."8 The tribal
water board issued a permit for the instream flow dedication pursuant
to their water code, and presented it to the state engineer, who
administed all water rights in the state.8 9 The state engineer refused to
enforce the permit, and the Tribes brought suit in the Wyoming state
court.90 The state court in Big Horn Ii held that the Tribes had the
right to dedicate a portion of their water to instream flow.91 The court
also held that the Tribes had the right to administer their own water
right on the Reservation. 92 The State appealed this decision to the
Wyoming Supreme Court.
The Wyoming Supreme Court in Big Horn III, by a split vote,
reversed. The court held that the Shoshone and Northern Arapaho
Tribes have no unfettered right to dedicate their water to instream
flow.93 The court held that under Big Horn I, the Tribes only had the
right to use their reserved water for irrigation.94 The court reasoned
that since Big Horn I determined that the primary purpose of the Res-
ervation was agriculture, and then used the PIA test to quantify the
reserved water right, the Tribes could only use their water for agricul-
tural purposes.95 The Wyoming Supreme Court also held that the
state engineer had the authority to administer the reserved water right
on the Wind River Indian Reservation.96 The lower court, it said, had
unlawfully removed the state engineer from administration. 97
The Wyoming Supreme Court asserted that any changes in the
Tribes' water use had to conform to state law.98 The court found
88. Big Horn II, 835 P.2d 273, 275 (Wyo. 1992).
In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 803
P.2d 61 (Wyo. 1990) (Big Horn I1), determined the standing of non-Indian claimants who had
not participated in the appeal of Big Horn L The Big Horn 11 decision determined none of the
issues involved in Big Horn III, and therefore will not be discussed.
89. Big Horn III. 835 P.2d at 275-76.
90. Id. at 276.
91. Id.; In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System,
No. 4993, at 16 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. Washakie County filed Mar. 11, 1991) (conclusion of law no. 3)
(on file with the Washington Law Review) [hereinafter District Court Opinion].
92. Big Horn 1I, 835 P.2d at 276; District Court Opinion, supra note 91, at 17 (conclusion of
law no. 4).
93. Big Horn III, 835 P.2d at 278-79 (3 of 5 justices joined in this holding).
94. Id. at 278.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 282-83. This is not the same situation as that determined in United States v.
Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1366 (9th Cir. 1984), where the state was allowed to regulate non-
Indian, surplus waters on the Spokane Indian Reservation.
97. Big Horn II, 835 P.2d at 282.




authority in United States v. New Mexico99 for this assertion. 0" In
New Mexico, the United States Supreme Court quantified the reserved
water right for the Gila National Forest.101 The New Mexico Court
held that the federal government reserved only the amount of water
necessary to fulfill the reservation's primary purpose.1 0 2 If the govern-
ment needed water only for a secondary purpose, it would be subject
to the state law of appropriation.1 0 3
In addition, the Big Horn III court stated that although Wyoming
recognizes instream flow as a beneficial use, only the state can own
instream rights. °10 4 Under state law, all water right holders must
divert the water or lose their water right, because a right holder's fail-
ure to divert leaves the water in instream flow, which the state
owns. 0 5 Under Wyoming law, therefore, the Tribes could not dedi-
cate a portion of their water to instream flow.106 Essentially, the Big
Horn III decision asserts that federally reserved water rights are sub-
ject to state law restrictions. Although the quantity of the Tribes'
water right was determined in Big Horn I, the Big Horn III court has
qualified the water right by limiting the Tribes' use of their own water.
III. THE BIG HORN III DECISION MISAPPLIES RESERVED
WATER RIGHTS LAW
The Big Horn III decision is wrong for several reasons. First, the
Wyoming Supreme Court erred by applying state law to a federal
right. Second, the court applied the federal law incorrectly. It used
quantification methods to qualify the reserved water right. Third, the
court incorrectly determined that the Shoshone and Northern Arap-
aho Tribes could not dedicate a portion of their water to instream
flow. Finally, the court erred in granting the state engineer authority
to administer the reserved water on the Wind River Indian Reserva-
tion. State administration of the tribal water right interferes with tri-
bal government.10 7
99. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
100. Big Horn III, 835 P.2d at 278.
101. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 698.
102. Id. at 702.
103. Id.
104. Big Horn III, 835 P.2d at 279 (citing Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-1002(e) (Supp. 1991)).
105. Id. at 279-80.
106. Id. at 279.
107. The Wyoming court's action may also constitute a taking of the Tribes' reserved water
right. See Ann Kadlecek, Note, The Effect of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on the
Law of Regulatory Takings, 68 WASH. L. REv. 415, 432-33 (1993) (discussing the possible
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A. The Court Erred by Applying State Law
The Big Horn H1I court contradicts well-settled federal water law.
The court failed to apply federal water law and instead applied state
law to the Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes' reserved water
right. The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that
federal reserved water rights are governed by federal law.108 Substan-
tive state law only applies when Congress specifically delegates federal
plenary powers over the law to the state. 109 Congress had not dele-
gated to Wyoming any power over the substantive reserved water
rights law at issue in Big Horn IL The Wyoming Supreme Court,
therefore, specifically contradicted United States Supreme Court pre-
cedent when it applied Wyoming substantive water law to the Tribes'
reserved water right.
L Misapplication of United States v. New Mexico
The Wyoming Supreme Court claims that under United States v.
New Mexico, federal law does not preempt state control over tribal
water rights.11 ° The court, however, misunderstands New Mexico.
The New Mexico decision is not applicable to qualification of Indian
reserved water rights for two reasons. First, the New Mexico Court
dealt with the reserved water right for the Gila National Forest,1 1
which is a non-Indian land reservation. The Supreme Court treats
Indian reserved water rights with greater deference than other
reserved water rights, because the federal government owes greater
protection to Indian reserved water rights than other reserved water
rights. 112 Second, the Big Horn III court restricts the use of a reserved
water right, while the New Mexico Court only quantified a reserved
water right. Unlike the Wyoming court's interpretation of the New
Mexico decision, New Mexico actually quantified a :Federally reserved
water right,113 it did not qualify the use of that right. 11 Big Horn III
decrease in the property unit examined in takings analysis, as suggested by Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992)).
108. See, eg., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128, 145-46 (1976); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1976); United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 526
(1971).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
110. Big Horn II 835 P.2d at 278-79.
111. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 698.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
113. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.




qualified a reserved water right, it did not quantify the right. New
Mexico is completely inapplicable to Big Horn IIL" 5
2. Misuse of the McCarran Amendment
In Big Horn I, the Wyoming court properly asserted jurisdiction
under the McCarran Amendment to determine the federal reserved
water right attached to the Wind River Reservation.1 16 The purpose
of the McCarran Amendment is to allow just such an adjudication. 1 7
The Big Horn III court, however, went beyond the bounds of jurisdic-
tion granted by the McCarran Amendment. It used its state adjudica-
tion jurisdiction to apply state law to the federal reserved water rights
doctrine.
The inapplicability of state law provided the grounds for the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton.'18 The
Walton court held that the State of Washington could not regulate the
Indian reserved water right on the Colville Indian Reservation. 19 The
court found that under the reserved rights doctrine, a reservation of
water cannot be subjected to state appropriation law. 120 The reserved
water is free from state appropriation because it is a superior right. 21
The Walton court upheld the Colville Confederated Tribes' right to
administer their own water. 122
The Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes in Big Horn III did
not seek water in excess of their right. If the Tribes sought to increase
their water supply, then they might be subjected to the state law of
appropriation.1 23 The Tribes, however, sought only to administer
their water right. They should not be subjected to state law.
B. The Court Erred in Using the Quantification Methods to Qualify
the Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes' Reserved
Water Right
In addition to incorrectly applying state law, the Wyoming Supreme
Court also misapplied federal law. The court misapplied the PIA and
115. Even if the New Mexico rule means that additional water desired by the Shoshone and
Northern Arapaho Tribes must be appropriated under state law, the New Mexico decision does
not apply state law to the Tribes' use of their reserved water. See id. at 699.
116. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d 76, 88 (Wyo. 1988).
117. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
118. 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981).
119. Id at 51.
120. See id. at 46.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 51.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
449
Washington Law Review
primary purpose tests. In Big Horn 1, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the PIA test as a means to quantify the Tribes' reserved
water right."' The PIA test is only a quantification measure, not a
means of qualifying a reserved water right.125 In Big Horn II1, the
court used the PIA test to qualify the Tribes' use of their water
right. 126 The Big Horn III court used the PIA test for the wrong
objectives.
The Wyoming court in Big Horn I qualified the tribal reserved
water right by holding that the water could not be leased off-reserva-
tion.127 On review, the United States Supreme Court did not address
this issue."' The Supreme Court only affirmed the use of the PIA test
for quantifying the Tribes' reserved water right. The Big Horn III
court misinterpreted Big Horn I. It construed the PIA test as a
method for qualifying the Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes'
right to use their water, based on a Wyoming court holding in Big
Horn I that the Supreme Court did not address. The Supreme Court's
narrow holding in Big Horn I does not justify the Big Horn III court's
application of the PIA test. The Wyoming court should not have
relied on Big Horn I to support its limitation on the Tribes' use of
their water.
The Big Horn III court also used the primary purpose test to qualify
the Tribes' water right. 29 This use of the primary purpose test contra-
dicts federal precedent and undermines Congress' attempts to provide
permanent homelands for Indian tribes. The Supreme Court has used
the primary purpose test only to quantify non-Indian reserved water
rights. 130 The Supreme Court has never used the primary purpose test
to qualify a water right,13 1 nor has it ever used the primary purpose
test even to quantify an Indian reserved water right. The Court's limi-
tation on the use of the primary purpose test is consistent with the
federal government's goals of providing permanent homelands for
Indian tribes, since a permanent homeland requires water for more
than just one "primary purpose.'132
124. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
126. See Big Horn 111, 835 P.2d 273, 278 (Wyo. 1992).
127. See Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d 76, 100 (Wyo. 1988).
128. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (explaining the Court's partial affirmance
of Big Horn I).
129. Big Horn II, 835 P.2d at 278-79.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
131. See, e.g., supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
132. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47-49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,




Under federal law, tribes are not limited in the use of their reserved
water.1 33 The Supreme Court has not qualified tribal water rights, and
the Wyoming court does not have the power to restrict the Shoshone
and Northern Arapaho Tribes' use of their reserved water right.
C. The Court Erred in Determining that Instream Flow Is Not a
Beneficial Use Available to the Shoshone and Northern
Arapaho Tribes
The Wyoming Supreme Court determined that the Shoshone and
Northern Arapaho Tribes could not dedicate a portion of their water
to instream flow. 134 The court conceded that instream flow is a benefi-
cial use,135 but argued that it was not one available to the Tribes. 136
The court reasoned that because instream flow is a highly valued
resource, Wyoming has the exclusive right to maintain the instream
flows within the state. 3 7 The court claimed that under the Wyoming
Constitution, the state owns all instream flows. 138 Therefore, the
court held, the Tribes do not have a right to instream flow. 139
Federal law is supreme and cannot be contradicted by state law."4
The Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes have a property right,
granted under federal law, in the reserved water on the Wind River
Indian Reservation. 41 The Wyoming Supreme Court ignored the fed-
eral reserved rights doctrine, determining that state ownership over-
rides reserved water rights. Federally reserved water rights have never
been subject to state control. Absent delegation of such authority
from Congress, Wyoming cannot assert regulatory power over the
waters reserved for the Tribes on the Reservation. 142
Not only does Wyoming have no right to prevent the Tribes from
dedicating their water to instream flow, it also stands to benefit from
the Tribes' dedication. The State will receive two types of benefits cre-
ated by the Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes' instream flow
133. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
134. Big Horn I, 835 P.2d 273, 279-80 (Wyo. 1992).
135. Id. Instream flow benefits water rights holders and society generally by providing a
variety of social, economic, and environmental benefits. See McKinney, supra, note 11, at 83; A.
Dan Tarlock, New Commons in Western Waters, in WATER AND THE AMERICAN WEST 69,
71-73 (David H. Getches ed., 1988).
136. Big Horn II1, 835 P.2d at 279.
137. Id. at 279-80.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 279.
140. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
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dedication. Instream flow has a value of its own, which will benefit
the State generally. 43 The Tribes' dedication to instream flow also
prevents them from diverting all the water to which they are entitled.
The quantity of reserved water is greater than the water flow remain-
ing after all state water users exercise their water rights. ' 44 Therefore,
if the Tribes asserted their superior right to divert their entire allotted
quantity of water from the flow, the state water users would lose
water. 145
D. The Court Erred in Determining that the State Engineer Has
Authority to Administer the Tribes' Reserved Water Right
on the Reservation
The lower court prohibited the state engineer from regulating water
administration on the Wind River Reservation, and allowed the Sho-
shone and Northern Arapaho Tribes to administer their own water. 14 6
The Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that the lower court's action was
an illegal interference with the executive branch of the state govern-
ment. 147 The Wyoming Supreme Court restored the engineer's
authority over the administration of the reserved water right on the
Wind River Indian Reservation. 148
The Wyoming Supreme Court's action restoring the engineer's
authority interferes with tribal government. 49 Both Congress and the
United States Supreme Court recognize the tribal right of self-govern-
ance on Indian reservations. 1 0 The right of self-governance necessar-
ily includes freedom from state regulation. The Supreme Court does
not allow states to interfere with tribal property or tribal government,
absent an express delegation of such power from Congress.' The Big
Horn II court, however, allows the state to interfere with both. The
Big Horn II decision allows the state engineer to regulate tribal water
use, which interferes with tribal property and tribal government. 152
143. See supra note 135.
144. See Big Horn III, 835 P.2d 273, 287 (Wyo. 1992) (J. Cardine, concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
145. Id.
146. District Court Opinion, supra note 91, at 17.
147. Big Horn III 835 P.2d at 282.
148. Id.
149. This interference ironically is similar to the interference chimed by the Wyoming
Supreme Court as the basis for reinstating the engineer, although the interference is now with a
different sovereign, on the sovereign's own land.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 40-51, 73-80.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
152. Not only do Indian tribes have the right to self-governance, but experience shows that




IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE WYOMING SUPREME
COURT'S ERRORS
The Big Horn III court permits state control over the reserved
water right belonging to the Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes.
The decision contradicts judicial precedent, undermines tribal sover-
eignty, and defeats the federal goals of tribal self-determination and
self-sufficiency by denying tribes the right to use their few remaining
resources as they judge best. To achieve economic self-sufficiency,
tribes must be able to put their water to economically beneficial uses.
Big Horn III, however, asserts state control over the Tribes' beneficial
use of instream flow. Furthermore, the court's reasoning supports
state control over any tribal resource that a state might deem valuable.
If the state can assert control over such resources, then the state may
place tribes economically second to the state and effectively oppress
the tribal economy.I53 States may use their power, as in Big Horn III,
to divert tribal resources until they are depleted, and thus defeat the
goal of tribal self-sufficiency.
State administration of tribal water rights is not only antithetical to
self-determination and self-sufficiency, but also denigrates tribal sover-
eignty. The reserved water right is tribal property.15 4 Allowing states
to dictate how tribes may develop their property rights disregards the
tribes' inherent right to self-governance as sovereign governments.
State regulation of tribal water differs dramatically from state regula-
resources. Other tribes in the western states effectively manage their own water rights. The
Yakima Indian Nation, for instance, manages water administration and conservation on the
Yakima Reservation. See Holly v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,
655 F. Supp. 557, 558-60 (E.D. Wash. 1985) (holding that tribes cannot regulate non-Indian use
of excess waters, but extent of tribal control over reserved waters is an issue of tribal versus
federal control, not state control), aff'd sub nom. Holly v. Waston Totus, 812 F.2d 714 (9th
Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 823 (1987). Similarly, tribal management of fisheries has also been
very successful. Fish runs in Washington, for instance, have grown since the tribes implemented
their management systems. See FAY G. COHEN, TREATIES ON TRIAL 163-68 (1986).
The Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes, as sovereign governments, are capable of
managing their water right. The Tribes have an effective water code. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae
Brief of Wyoming Wildlife Federation and National Wildlife Federation at 12, Big Horn III (No.
91-83) (on file with the Washington Law Review) (comparing the Wind River Water Code to
Wyoming law) [hereinafter Amicus Brief]. Their instream flow dedication, based on scientific
analysis, is for the benefit of riparian life, including fisheries. See Brief of Appellees Shoshone
and Northern Arapaho Tribes at 37-38, Big Horn III (No. 91-43) (on file with the Washington
Law Review). The Tribes have proven their dedication to enhancing the ecological well-being of
their community through the promulgation of their water code. See Amicus Brief at 16. Tribal
management, therefore, is not only a right belonging to the Tribes, but is also not a threat to the
state's interest in protecting natural resources.
153. See generally Williams, supra note 29, for a discussion of the tragic effects of interference
with native cultures.
154. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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tion of individual water rights. The states have jurisdiction to regulate
each individual state citizen's use of water according to the citizen's
determined needs and uses. The state cannot, however, make the same
determination on an Indian reservation. Indian tribes on reservations
are distinct, self-governing societies. As a tribal society's needs evolve
and change, tribal water needs and uses must accommodate the chang-
ing needs of tribal members. The self-governing tribe can assess these
needs and adjust the allowable water uses. Unilaterzd state determina-
tion of each reservation's water needs and acceptable uses interferes
with tribal government.
The Big Horn III decision has caused a conflict between federal and
state laws. Because more states are beginning to adjudicate Indian
water rights, danger exists that other states will use the Big Horn III
adjudication as precedent for further interference with tribal rights.
Federal Indian policy requires that Congress provide for tribal self-
governance and protect tribal sovereignty.155 Thus Congress has a
duty to avoid further proliferation of the misapplication of legal doc-
trines espoused by the Big Horn III court. Congress should pass fed-
eral legislation to overrule the Big Horn III decision, and thereby
remove the legal disparity created by the decision.
Congress can provide clear guidance in the application of the legal
doctrines entangled in water law adjudications by enacting federal leg-
islation for the administration of Indian reserved water rights. Federal
legislation should not only overrule Big Horn II, but also clearly state
that state law does not apply to Indian reserved water rights. Such
legislation would provide uniformity and equity in Indian reserved
water law. It would further congressional policy encouraging tribal
self-governance and economic self-sufficiency. 56
V. CONCLUSION
The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Big Horn III is a step
on the road to extinction of tribal sovereignty. The Big Horn III court
used its jurisdiction under the McCarran Amendment to apply its own
state's substantive law on the Wind River Indian Reservation, a use
contrary to the purpose of the McCarran Amendment. The Big Horn
III court also used the federal reserved water rights doctrine in a man-
ner adverse to its purpose and meaning when it misused the reserved
155. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49, 70-71.
156. See COHEN, supra note 18, at 583-84 (arguing that the primary or secondary purpose




water rights quantification measures to limit the Shoshone and North-
ern Arapaho Tribes' use of their own water.
Federal legislation should provide for uniform application of
reserved water rights doctrine. The reserved water rights doctrine is
federal law, and therefore should not vary from state to state. Federal
legislation should also prevent further denigration of tribal sovereignty
by asserting tribal self-governing power over reserved water rights.
Congress' duty to protect Indian tribes from state control reinforces
the need for federal legislation to overrule Big Horn I.
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